Since the last decades of the 20th century the meaning and content of knowledge has dramatically changed. This necessitates adopting a historical perspective in ap­proa­ching the questions of knowledge. But so far all the efforts of putting knowledge in a historical perspective since Hegel’s historization of Spirit either suffer from the limitations of the presupposition of the One or fail to ground the historicity of knowledge on the history of coming-to-be and passing-away. Moving from Heidegger’s ‘history of Being’ toward the (...) Aristotelian understanding of coming-to-be and passing away as a process of becoming has the potential to open up new avenues in approaching the historical question of knowledge as well as establishing its relation with the never com­plete ground of the entities as its historical a priori condition of possibility. (shrink)

First published in 1953, this seminal introduction to political philosophy is intended for both the student of political theory and for the general reader. After an introduction which explains the nature and purpose of philosophy, Dr Murray provides a critical examination of the principle theories advanced by political philosophers from Plato to Marx, paying special attention to contemporary issues. The book also makes an attempt to define the essential issues of philosophical significance in contemporary politics, with special reference to the (...) conflict between political authority and individual rights, and to show how the different moral assumptions underlying authoritarian and democratic systems of government are ultimately based upon different theories of logic. (shrink)

RESUMEN:El siguiente escrito ensaya una interpretación del rendimiento del mito de los metales expuesto por Platón en su diálogo llamado Politeia a propósito de la siguiente interrogación: ¿Cómo se constituye el orden social en la pólis platónica? Para responder a esta pregunta debemos esclarecernos respecto de: i) El papel de la educación en la constitución del orden social. ii) La correlación entre el mito de los metales y el orden social. iii) La constitución tripartita de la psykhḗ humana. Una vez (...) aclarado estos distintos puntos podremos comprender la oculta pero significativa función del mito de los metales en la constitución del orden social platónico. ABSTRACT:This article attempts an interpretation of the account of the myth of the metals as expounded by Plato in the Politeia. We address the following question: How is the social order established in the Platonic polis? To answer this question we must clarify: i) the role of education in the constitution of the social order; ii) the correlation between the myth of the metals and the social order; iii) the tripartite constitution of the human psyche. Once these various points have been made clear, we can understand the hidden but significant function of the myth of the metals in the constitution of the Platonic social order. (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

[R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...) no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials. /// [David Wiggins] Evans was not wrong (I maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play, is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred. (shrink)

I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life's ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all (...) those other philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms have been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. True, their skeletons, indigestible to worms, remained, and were surprisingly similar to one another. But I was led to think again about what one can, and what one cannot, achieve in this direction. (shrink)

ARISTOTLE'S PROGRAM Aristotle says outright that the law of non-contradiction cannot be demonstrated: you can't prove everything, and among the things you ...

In this work, the author has fashioned out of the logical and linguistic theses of his earlier books a full-scale but readily intelligible account of moral argument.

R. M. J. Dammann; VIII*—Metaphors and Other Things, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 125–140, https://doi.org/10.